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The budgets of development NGOs have risen dramatically over the last decades. In 
stark contrast to bilateral donors, the geographic choices of NGOs remain virtually 
unexplored. Using a new dataset and Lorenz curves, this paper shows that NGOs are 
very active in some countries and hardly active in others. A clustering of NGO activity 
takes place in UN-labelled high priority countries, but ample room for improved 
targeting exists. Aid concentration curves provide insight into whether NGOs target the 
same countries as bilateral donors. The article concludes that this is the case and that 
NGOs are thus acting as complements. The drawback of this complementary approach 
is that it reinforces the donor-darling/donor-orphan divide. The paper concludes with 
some research suggestions and preliminary policy implications. 
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The Central African Republic is an extremely poor, landlocked country where around 
three million people live below the poverty line. Similarly, Malawi is also a poor 
country with no access to the sea, and four million poor. One would expect these two 
countries to receive roughly the same volume of aid from organizations such as Care, 
World Vision and Plan. In reality, however, 50 of the world’s largest nongovernmental 
(NGOs) development organizations spend only about €1 million a year in the Central 
African Republic, compared with more than €80 million for Malawi. This example 
suggests that there might be countries where aid to NGOs is sparse, and others where it 
is generous, which causes concentration of aid. Perhaps NGOs made this choice because 
official donors were focusing on the Central African Republic? To the contrary: official 
donors provided Malawi in excess of €480 million in 2005, compared to only €71 
million to the Central African Republic. 
This paper aims to answer two questions: is NGO aid heavily concentrated in some 
countries while leaving other countries behind? In addition, if NGO aid is concentrated, 
is it concentrated in countries where other actors are not active? Concentration is not 
necessarily a bad thing; it depends on the countries in which concentration is taking 
place—is it taking place in priority countries or in countries where NGOs enjoy 
comparative advantage? Reliable datasets on the expenditures of international 
development NGOs do not exist. Therefore, a new dataset was developed for this 
article, in which the country allocations of twenty of the world’s leading international 
development NGOs are compiled (Appendix 2 provides an overview of the NGOs 
included in the sample). In addition, 21 interviews were held with key NGO 
decisionmakers and four with government officials of relevant ministries. 
Many scholars focus on the country allocations of bilateral and multilateral donors 
(Burnside and Dollar 1997; Collier and Dollar 2002; Hansen and Tarp 2000). In 
addition, many academics research NGO aid at the subnational level, but not at the 
country level (e.g., Zeller et al. 2001; Bebbington 2004; Fruttero and Gauri 2005; Barr 
and Fafchamps 2005). There seems to be a blind spot in research when it comes to 
country allocations of international development NGOs, the recent work by Yontcheva 
and co-authors (2005 and 2006) being a notable example. The lack of academic or 
political debate on this subject is surprising, given that aid allocations through these 
agencies have risen dramatically. In 2004 at least US$4 billion was spent by donors on 
NGOs (Agg 2006). The combined budget of the 100 largest development NGOs was 
approximately US$12 (Koch, own calculation) in 2004-05. Yet, it is not only the 
financial size of NGO aid that makes it valuable as a distinctive field of research. Policy 
documents from the World Bank (1998) and the United Nations (2005), among others, 
suggest that many are of the opinion that NGO aid can be effective in a different policy 
environment than government-to-government aid, thereby turning the current dominant 
aid effectiveness paradigm (‘aid is more effective in countries with good governance’) 
at least partially upside down (Burnside and Dollar 2000).   
The remainder of this article commences with a theoretical framework for analysing the 
concentration and dispersion in NGOs’ choice of location. Thereafter, section 3 
examines the background on the geographic decision process of international 
development NGOs. Subsequently, section 4 demonstrates how NGOs concentrate their 
activities, shedding light on differences between donors and different types of 
recipients. Section 5 shows that NGO aid is behaving more as a complement than as a  
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substitute to bilateral aid. Finally, drawing on the theoretical framework and the 
empirical analysis, the paper concludes with some policy suggestions.  
2  Nonprofit location theory 
Many factors influence the NGOs’ choice of location. Scholars on organizational design 
and psychology explain country allocations by focusing on the structure of 
organizations (for instance, whether NGOs have existing country desks) and on the role 
of individuals within this structure (for instance, the personality of country officers). 
Others point to the historical and cultural ties between the NGOs and certain countries, 
and of course the political preferences of back donors. While acknowledging that these 
factors probably play a role, they fall beyond the scope of this article. This paper 
focuses on theories that deal with concentration and dispersion effects.  
To understand the forces that drive the geographic decision of NGOs, the literature on 
nonprofit location theory provides some interesting frameworks. Nonprofit location 
theory is not a distinctive field within geography, which is not surprising since even the 
public location theory is only a few decades old (DeVerteuil 2000). Most of the time, 
scholars of the nonprofit theory use a supply and demand framework, with supply 
referring to the presence of funding and demand to the needs of the local population 
(Gronbjerg and Paarlberg 2001; Wolch and Geiger 1983). In this model, location 
choices are a tradeoff between these two forces. Weisbrod (1988) has made a famous 
specification of this model; he shows that demands for nonprofit organizations may be 
greater in heterogeneous areas, as the government fails to cater to all the disparate 
preferences.  
2.1 Concentration 
Recently scholars have applied insights from the new geographical economics to the 
field of nonprofit location theory, thereby shifting the focus to processes of 
concentration and dispersion (Bielefeld and Murdoch 2004). These insights come from 
the work on for-profit firms by Krugman, who explains concentration as ‘pervasive 
increasing returns and imperfect competition, multiple equilibria everywhere and often 
decisive role for history, accident and perhaps sheer self-fulfilling prophecy’ (Krugman 
1991 and 1998). This article examines in more detail four factors that lead to 
concentration (centripetal forces): internal economies of scale, external economies, a 
thick labour market and blame-sharing effects. It subsequently discusses four factors 
that stimulate dispersion (centrifugal forces).  
First, internal economies of scale arise when an organization achieves more of its aims 
by clustering its activities. As economists put it, when there are increasing returns at the 
organization  level induced, for instance, by capital-intensive machines, this will 
stimulate a multinational organization to concentrate its investments. In the case of 
NGOs working in field offices, it is more efficient to reduce the number of countries 
where they are active, as they can use the overhead for additional programme officers 
instead of constructing facilities.  
Second, external economies of scale arise when organizations can achieve a greater 
number of their goals when they cluster their activities. Economists show that a  
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decrease in average costs, for instance because of cheaper inputs, encourages 
organizations to locate near each other (concentrate). These concepts are often applied 
in business analysis (Porter 2000; Morosino 2004; Keeble et al. 1999). In nonprofit 
location theory, this is rare but Bielefeld and Murdoch (2004) address these effects and 
call them agglomeration economies. They include such factors as (i) shared 
infrastructure, which reduces transportation, communication and supply costs;   
(ii) access to a pool of labour or specialized inputs; (iii) knowledge spillovers between 
organizations as a result of contact between firms and people; (iv) information on the 
demand or feasibility of production at a particular location and (v) reduction of 
consumer search costs, which leads to increased demand at a particular location. In the 
case of international development NGOs, these effects are, for instance, visible for those 
that work through local partners. When one international NGO has invested time and 
money in the financial management systems of a local partner, it is attractive for other 
international NGOs to work also with this partner, instead of going to another country 
where partners still need to be introduced to similar western systems.  
Venables (2001) analyses why economies of scale can lead to long-term division 
between the core and periphery. According to Venables, the combination of forward 
and backward linkages creates a potential process of cumulative causation: expansion of 
downstream activity increases demand for upstream output that attracts entry, 
improving the supply (price or varieties) of intermediates, attracting further downstream 
entry, and so on. In the international NGO scene, one can think of local consultants and 
evaluators. When their number increases in a particular location, more NGOs will 
choose to locate in that particular country, as qualified local consultants are present, 
leading yet to another increase in their numbers and quality. This can result in a 
constantly self-reinforcing pattern of location choices that can stimulate the formation 
of the core and the periphery (Brakman, Garretsen and van Marrewijk 2001). Most of 
the production takes place at the core, whereas the periphery remains largely an inactive 
area.  
Third, the mobility of international NGO staff contributes to the agglomeration of 
NGOs. Labour mobility implies the flexibility of workers to move from one region to 
another. The factor driving people to migrate to different regions is a higher real wage. 
If real wages (or the quality of life) are higher in another region, a part of the labour 
force is likely to move. International NGO staff can be considered to be internationally 
mobile and to contribute to agglomeration; they move from one ‘hotspot’ to the next, be 
it Kosovo, East-Timor or Sri Lanka. The movement of labour has consequences: the 
labour market for personnel with particular skills expands in these agglomerations. Past 
and present organizational arrangements are also an important factor explaining new 
organizational growth, as it strengthens the organizational capacities of a population 
(Lincoln 1977). He finds that the strongest predictor of any one category of voluntary 
association is the presence of other voluntary organizations. In the case of development 
NGOs, it is clear that the discourse that local organizations need to master to obtain 
international funding, such a log frame analysis, requires training. Once local 
organizations master these skills, other international NGOs are more likely to fund these 
organizations as well, contributing to further agglomeration.  
Fourth, Easterly, drawing on the agency theory, presents another argument to explain 
why NGOs might cluster their activities. ‘Agencies handle the high risks in foreign aid 
by the time-honoured bureaucratic strategy of sharing blame. The bureaucracies  
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intermingle their outputs so evaluators don’t know who to blame for bad outcomes’ 
(Easterly 2002: 31).  
2.2  Dispersion 
This paper also deals with the four centrifugal forces—competition effects, dispersion 
of demand, reputation concerns and transport costs.  
First, authors analysing the location choices of nonprofit actors recognize that the desire 
to avoid direct competition could induce organizations to locate away from other similar 
agencies (Bielefeld and Murdoch 2004; Baum and Oliver 1996). The resulting pattern in 
a given area would be dispersion. If one applies the theory to international development 
NGOs, one can see this happening. In relatively new geographic areas, it is easier to 
find exclusive partners as there are no competitor international NGOs.  
Second, the dispersion of demand creates a centrifugal force. The majority of the 
impoverished, who live in poor regions and need the services of NGOs, are rather 
immobile and dispersed, which stimulates the dispersion of NGOs. Krugman refers to 
this force as the immobility of inputs.  
Third, Fruttero and Gauri (2005) focus on how the concerns for reputation affect 
location decisions. If NGO reputation is important to donors, as it appears to be, then 
new and unknown NGOs might undertake risky action which, if successful, could 
endorse their ability. This will promote operations in regions and countries where none 
or few other actors are active. (Organizations that already have a good reputation, 
however, will prefer to remain in countries where others are active, so that if there is 
project failure, they will not loose their reputation, as others can be blamed.) 
Fourth, high transport costs constitute a centrifugal force, as production of the good 
needs to be in the proximity of the end-user of the service and the end-users may be 
dispersed (Mayer 2004). In terms of international development NGOs, for those sectors 
in which tacit local knowledge, for instance, is important—such as family planning 
programmes (for which transport costs are high, if it can be transported at all)—NGOs 
would prefer to be close to the end-users, resulting in a pattern of dispersion.  
Discussion of the agglomeration and dispersion effects has been a key concern for 
public location theorists, a realm that attempts to find a balance between equity and 
efficiency. For some of the reasons pointed out above, an efficient allocation tends to be 
one in which the facilities are located in the proximity of each other. Yet, equity 
concerns favour dispersion, as this increases the access of the population to services. 
Consequently, there are competing forces at hand. This resonates with the theoretical 
debates taking place within the aid allocation literature. Terminology differs, but the 
underlying theory is the same. One school of thought, known as the utilitarian approach, 
focuses on reaching the maximum number of people (e.g., Collier and Dollar 2002), 
whereas another school focuses on creating an approach based on equality of 
opportunity (Llavador and Roemer 2001; Cogneau and Naudet 2004). The former 
criticizes the latter for achieving too little results, whereas the latter blames the former 




Forces influencing NGO locations 
Centripetal forces   Centrifugal forces  
  
  Internal economies of scale    Avoiding competition, increasing coverage 
  External economies of scale    Dispersion of demand 
 Labour  mobility   Reputation  effects 
 Blame-sharing  effects   High  transport  costs 
 
In the literature on NGOs, there is some concern that nonprofit organizations ignore 
equity. Schmid (2003) argues that nongovernmental agencies can ignore equity in the 
delivery of services. While government agencies have to be universalistic, nonprofit 
agencies can be particularistic. Whereas bilateral aid has the characteristics of a public 
good (non-exclusionary and non-subtractable), NGO aid shares characteristics more 
with a toll good (exclusionary) and common pool good (non-subtractability), depending 
on the intervention strategy used (Ostrom and Ostrom 1999). Governments must have 
clear criteria for targeting, while nonprofit agencies do not need to serve all the people 
within their target group and can select clients according to a group characteristic, for 
example, the place of residence (Lipsky and Smith 1990).  
The first part of this report examines the question of whether international aid NGOs 
display a pattern of concentration and if so, the type of countries and regions where this 
is taking place (section 4). Yet, it is not advisable to research NGO aid in isolation. 
Earlier research by Koch (2006) suggests that bilateral aid generates positive externalities 
that pull NGOs in the direction of countries where bilateral aid is also present. Joassart-
Marcelli and Wolch (2003) also find these interaction effects and demonstrate that 
government support pulls NGO aid into certain regions. The second part of this report 
(section 5) deals with the relationship between the geographic choices of bilateral 
donors and NGOs. 
3  Background on the country allocation processes of international development 
NGOs 
The first question that this paper addresses is whether a process of concentration is 
affecting the country allocations of NGOs. To understand the basis of country allocation 
decisions taken by NGOs, interviews were conducted with 21 major international NGOs 
from Germany, Norway, the United States and the Netherlands.1 Several reasons 
promoted this choice: these four countries, together with Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom, house the largest development NGOs; and they represent four distinct co-
financing systems. The German system is clearly corporatist, the Norwegian system 
social-democratic, the American system liberal and the Dutch is changing rapidly from 
a corporatist to a liberal system.  
                                                 
1  The following criteria are used for the selection of NGOs: (i) they must have an annual budget of at 
least €10 million; (ii) at least 50 per cent of funding needs to be development related; (iii) they need to 
be independent from sister organizations in their decision process on country allocations; and   
(iv) organizations providing mainly technical assistance are excluded. A list of the included 
organizations is given in Appendix 2.  
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The country allocation processes of these NGOs are quite distinct. Whereas the 
American government earmarks their funding for certain countries and thus exercises 
direct influence on the country allocations of its organizations, this is not the case for the 
NGOs from the three other countries. The governments of the Netherlands and of 
Germany give a block grant to the most important organizations, a fact which severely 
restricts, both directly and indirectly, the influence of the bilateral donor on the allocation 
of countries. The system in Norway lies somewhere in between; according to Norwegian 
organizations, the government does not influence their country allocations directly, but 
has some impact indirectly through discussion. Even though the American government 
is clearly the most prescriptive in the country allocations of its NGOs, these appear to be 
least affected by it, mainly because of their relative financial independence from the 
government (Koch, Westeneng and Ruben 2007).  
The country allocation process of the NGOs is divided into two stages. First is the actual 
selection process of countries (what Neumayer calls the eligibility stage), and then, the 
actual decision allocation (level stage). There are significant differences in the manner 
in which organizations deal with the eligibility stage. Forty per cent of those 
interviewed stated that their organization had a formalized country selection process, 
meaning that the organization makes an official decision regarding the countries where 
it is active and that certain variables regarding the objectives of the NGO guide this 
decision. Most of these organizations undergo a country-selection exercise every 3-4 
years when the NGO submits a major grant proposal to the back donor. Typically, the 
highest administrative level of the NGO is involved in the decisionmaking process. 
Many organizations start the process by selecting some relevant international poverty 
indicators, such as the human development index for general organizations, or child 
welfare indicators for agencies focussed on children. Rigid adherence to these indicators 
in the country selection process can lead to drastic changes in the choice of countries. 
Often, in addition to poverty indicators, other criteria are included, such as whether the 
NGO is already present in a country and how successful its programmes have been.  
Also, 40 per cent of the interviewees (not necessarily the same as above) stated that 
their organizations had a formalized country  allocation process (the level stage). 
Officials with agencies with no formalized country-allocation system explain that as 
these are donor driven, they cannot make the choice themselves, or that they had an 
informal system. In organizations with an allocation system, it was obvious that 
employees at lower administrative levels were responsible for actual country 
allocations. If the agency had regional desks, as most do, various regional departments 
were allotted predetermined shares of the total budget, which they distributed among the 
countries on that particular organization’s ‘list’. The specific share of the budget is often 
based on the region’s previous level of funding. Some organizations, mainly those that 
have country offices, used a more market-oriented system and country offices submitted 
grant proposals to headquarters, where the best are selected.  
4 Concentration 
Various ways to measure concentration exist. For this research, the Gini coefficient was 
selected. The Gini coefficient is a measure of the inequality of distribution, defined as 
the ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve of distribution and the curve of uniform 
distribution, to the area under uniform distribution. It is a number between 0 and 1,  
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where 0 corresponds to perfect equality (i.e., everyone has the same income or any other 
measure of interest) and 1 corresponds to perfect inequality (i.e., one person has all the 
income while everyone else has zero income). 
4.1 Data 
This analysis is based on the self-reporting data of international NGOs, covering actual 
disbursements in fiscal year 2004. The data cover total expenditures of the 
organizations, including both private and public funding. Dependency on public funding 
is high, except for the American NGOs (Wang 2006; Koch, Westeneng and Ruben 
2007). 
Figure 1 
Lorenz curve for NGO aid, 2004 











Lorenz curve for NGO aid per donor country, 2004 
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These 22 NGOs spent €2.04 billion in DAC countries, or about €90 million per 
organization. This sample comprises all the countries that were included in the 2005 
DAC list because aid to these recipients qualifies as official development assistance 
(ODA).  
The Lorenz curve of total international NGO aid (Figure 1) shows that concentration is 
evident; 80 per cent of the people who live in DAC countries with the lowest share of 
NGO aid per capita receive only 20 per cent of the international NGO aid, and vice versa. 
Specific examples can elucidate this: Zambia, Nicaragua, Malawi and El Salvador receive 
more than €5 per capita of international NGO aid (from the NGOs in this sample) 
whereas Nigeria, the Central African Republic, India and Moldova receive less than 
€0.50 per capita. The Gini coefficient for total international NGO aid is 0.53, 
comparable to the income distribution of Latin American countries such as Mexico and 
El Salvador. 
Figure 2 shows that there are some differences between the organizations of the four 
countries. Norwegian NGO aid is the most concentrated, and German aid the most 
dispersed. Higher levels of concentration are not necessarily a bad thing; if concentration 
takes place in countries that are very needy, this could be a benefit. UNDP’s Human 
Development Report 2003 categorizes countries into three priority levels—non-priority, 
high priority and top priority. These can be used to analyse concentration.  
Table 2 
NGO aid allocations according to UN priority status, back-donor and recipient regions, 2004  
(in Euros per capita) 
Regions   Total NGO aid per 















Asia  Total 
             
  Non priority  
            
German NGOs  0.12  0.04  0.13 0.15  0.15 0.11  0.11 
Norwegian NGOs  0.04  0.02 0.13 0.05  0.04 0.10  0.05 
American NGOs  0.35  0.15  0.58 1.36  0.99 0.32  0.75 
Dutch NGOs  0.12  0.02  0.15 0.96  0.15 0.12  0.39 
Total 0.63  0.22  0.99  2.51 1.32  0.64  1.31 
             
  High priority  
             
German NGOs  0.42  0.12  0.02 0.18  0.01 0.16  0.24 
Norwegian NGOs  0.24  0.12 0.00 0.03  0.00 0.02  0.13 
American NGOs  1.95  0.64  0.04 0.46  0.01 0.14  1.05 
Dutch NGOs  0.35  0.10  0.18 0.00  0.00 0.13  0.22 
Total 2.96  0.98  0.23  0.67 0.02  0.46  1.64 
             
  Top priority  
             
German NGOs  0.13    0.03  0.35  0.00  .  0.13 
Norwegian NGOs  0.12    0.00  0.14  0.33  .  0.12 
American NGOs  1.47    2.42 4.00  1.35  .  1.58 
Dutch NGOs  0.22    0.16  0.54  0.02  .  0.23 
Total 1.95    2.61  5.03  1.70  .  2.07 
Source:   Compiled by the author based on data provided by NGOs.  
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Table 2 displays the average per capita allocation in euros, broken down by region, 
country of origin of donor organization, and by type of recipient country. The level of 
priority depends on two factors: the level of human poverty and the progress of these 
countries in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Thirty-one 
countries are classified as top priority, 28 as high priority, and the remainder as non-
priority.  
The table appears to demonstrate that NGOs in general allocate more aid to top-priority 
countries than the other two country groups. Caution is needed, however, as the size of 
the American NGOs and their focus on Latin America and the Caribbean substantially 
influence the results. Important differences emerge between different donors and 
between different regions. As the table shows, a substantial amount of NGO aid is 
earmarked to Latin America and the Caribbean as well as Africa, but little to South Asia 
or the Middle East and North Africa. A non-priority country in Latin America and the 
Caribbean receives many times the amount of aid per capita than high priority countries 
in the Middle East and North Africa or South Asia.2 Looking at the NGOs, grouped by 
country of origin, it becomes clear that there are significant differences among them. 
The German and Dutch organizations do not target the priority and top-priority 
countries, while the American and Norwegian organizations do. In analysing targeting 
at the regional level, it becomes evident that targeting is rather well done in East Asia 
and the Pacific (countries on the priority list receive on average substantially more aid 
per capita than those on the non-priority list) and reasonably well in Africa. However, in 
Europe and Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa and South 
Asia, targeting is rather weak because high-priority countries in these regions receive 
less than the non-priority recipients. That said, top-priority countries receive on average 
most aid per capita in all regions.  
Overall, the top-priority countries receive the most generous amounts of aid per capita, 
but there are significant differences between regions and donor countries. There appears 
to be considerable clustering in non-priority countries, which indicates that if the MDGs 
are the reference point, there are still possibilities to enhance the targeting of NGO aid. 
As stated, there is a multitude of factors that influence country-allocation decisions. 
This paper does not aim to identify all these factors; it merely attempts to establish if 
concentration is taking place, and if so, where. 
What is also salient is the relationship between population size and per capita aid. The 
more populous a country, the less aid per capita it receives from the NGOs (in this 
sample). In countries of less than five million, inhabitants receive on average €24 
annually, €10 in countries with populations of 5-20 million, about €6 in countries with 
20-100 million, and one euro in nations with populations exceeding 100 million (all 
from NGOs). There is a negative correlation between population and NGO aid per 
capita of -0.33 (significant at the 1 per cent).3 This confirms earlier studies by Teune 
and Dietz (2003), who observe that this small country bias is already evident in the 
Dutch NGO allocations.  
                                                 
2   Measured in purchasing power parity (PPP), the differences might be less, but the differences are 
striking.   
3  To reduce skweness in the sample a logaritm was used of the population variable. Very small 
countries (less than 1 million inhabitants) are excluded.  
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In sum, NGO aid is clearly concentrated, indicating that centripetal factors are stronger 
than centrifugal factors. In some countries NGOs are very active, whereas in other 
countries they are only marginally active or not at all. Clustering does not automatically 
develop in high-priority countries, as non-priority countries in Latin America, for 
instance, receive more aid per capita than top-priority ones in the Middle East and North 
Africa, for example. In addition, NGOs tend to concentrate their efforts in less populous 
countries. Interviews with the NGOs provided some insight as to why the 
abovementioned pattern of country-wise aid allocation has emerged. The reason for   
the focus of many NGOs on high-priority countries is reflected in their response to the 
question: how important are the needs of the local population in determining 
allocations? This item was rated on average 4.0 out of 5. At the same time, the 
interviewed NGOs also made it clear that in their country-allocation process, the 
presence of qualified local personnel was almost as important a determinant (3.8 out  
of 5). The better the local personnel situation, the more funding would go to that 
particular country. This is consistent with the new geographical economics argument of 
a thick labour market and external economies of scale. New NGOs take advantage of 
the available human capital that had been trained by agencies already present, thus 
stimulating concentration.  
5  NGO aid: complement or substitute? 
In economic terms, a good is considered a substitute for another kind of good insofar as 
the two can replace each other at least in some of their possible uses. The demand for 
the two kinds of good will be linked by the fact that customers can substitute one good 
for the other when it becomes advantageous to do so.4 Thus, an increase in price for one 
type of a good results in an increased demand for its substitute, while a price drop 
results in less demand for its substitutes. In this section ‘demand’ refers to the 
government aid agencies in OECD countries. Theoretically, they have two options for 
distributing aid: bilateral aid (government-to-government) and through NGOs. Thus, if 
the ‘price’ of the bilateral aid rises (that is, in countries where aid effectiveness is low 
and overhead costs high), the demand for NGO aid rises. But if the ‘price’ of bilateral 
aid decreases in these countries, the government aid agency’s need for NGO aid 
decreases. A complement good is the opposite of a substitute. This means that if more 
of one specific good is bought, more is also purchased of its complement.5 If NGO aid 
with respect to country allocations behaves as a complement, higher levels of bilateral 
aid to a particular country will also induce higher NGO allocations of aid.  
5.1  The substitute view 
Assuming that the goal of both types of aid is poverty reduction, the comparative 
advantages of NGO aid and bilateral aid need to be considered in order to comprehend 
the substitution effect. This can provide insight into the relative ‘price’. Various authors 
                                                 
4   A standard example for substitute goods is margarine and butter. When the price of one good 
decreases, the demand for the other decreases. 
5   The typical example of a complement good is hamburgers and buns; when the price of hamburgers 
decreases, their demand will increase, and so will the demand for buns.  
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have similarly concluded that NGO aid has a comparative advantage in countries with 
low levels of democratic governance, thus stimulating democratic governance (see 
Koch 2006 for an extended literature review on this topic; Steering Group 2002; Fowler 
and Biekart 1996; Blair in Helmich, Lehning and Bernard 1998; Edwards and Hulme 
1998; DFID 2006a). In economic terms, the relative ‘price’ of bilateral aid is high in 
countries with poor democratic governance which leads to greater demand from the 
government aid agency for NGO aid. Conversely, in countries with high levels of 
democratic governance, the ‘price’ of bilateral aid is low. The World Bank publication 
Assessing Aid was the first to propagate that government-to-government aid should go 
only to countries that already had good governance. Based on statistical research, Levin 
and Dollar (2004) conclude that this policy selectivity started to take shape in the 1990s, 
when there was a clear relationship for the first time between the level of bilateral aid 
and the quality of governance in recipient countries. This low ‘price’ of bilateral aid in 
countries with good democratic governance theoretically should lead to less demand 
from government aid agencies for NGO aid in such recipients. To conceptualize NGO 
aid as a substitute for bilateral aid, this scenario is elaborated here for various levels of 
democratic governance. 
In dictatorships, it is almost impossible for any type of aid actors to operate, be it 
bilateral or NGOs. In such cases, the government-to-government  aid relationship is 
limited as donors are unwilling to finance dictatorships. Thus financing NGOs might be 
desirable from a theoretical perspective but in some cases is simply too dangerous. In 
countries like North Korea and Myanmar, aid to pro-democratization NGOs is certainly 
important, but because of its covert nature, such support is rather limited. When 
dictatorships enter a period of relative openness, flows to opposition movements can 
increase, indicating a slightly relative decrease in the price of NGO aid, leading to a 
relative drop in demand for bilateral aid from the government aid agency.  
According to the substitute view, countries that have partially democratic governance 
should be the focus of NGO aid, as these are the type of countries in which it can make 
a difference. When bilateral and multilateral aid cannot reach the poor, NGO aid should 
step in. As the World Bank (1998: 104) puts it:  
in highly distorted environments the government is failing to provide 
supportive policies and effective services. That is why government-to-
government financial transfers produce poor results. Effective aid in such 
an environment often involves supporting civil society to pressure the 
government to change or to take service provision directly into its own 
hands (or to do both).  
Dutch policy documents argue along similar lines (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2001a): 
in cases of bad governance, bilateral aid relationships are often 
underdeveloped; cooperation from civil society to civil society is the 
only way.  
An anonymous representative from the NGO department of the German Ministry of 
Economic Cooperation and Development states:  
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In fragile states we cannot work with the government, but NGOs can 
work on social networks and institutions. When a reasonable level of this 
is in place, the direct government support can take over. 
The supporters of the substitute view argue that in partially democratically governed 
countries, there are only some agents and drivers of change that merit support. If all 
countries with less than total democratic governance were deprived of bi- and 
multilateral aid, virtually no country would qualify for this type of assistance (Hout and 
Koch 2006). Yet, as the high costs of monitoring aid to countries with only limited 
democratic governance drive up the ‘price’ of bilateral and multilateral aid, the demand 
for this type of aid should be less than the demand for aid to governments of countries 
with firmly established public accountability mechanisms.  
According to the substitute view, once a country improves its level of democratic 
governance, the comparative advantages of government-to-government aid increase. 
The comparative advantages of NGOs remain strong in some sub-sectors such as 
democratic governance, for example, but will disappear in other sectors, such as 
education. Once a state becomes progressively more democratic and accountability 
mechanisms are in place, funds can be channelled increasingly through the government 
and monitoring costs reduced. If the funding level of NGOs in these policy 
environments remains high, they are effectively taking over the role of the state. Since 
the accountability structure between local and international NGOs is by definition 
unequal (local organizations cannot vote international aid agencies out of power), it is 
desirable that funding for service delivery is increasingly channelled through the 
government budget.6 A democratically-elected government could still choose to channel 
the funding through local NGOs. In countries with good democratic governance, NGOs 
can still engage in setting the political agenda by promoting, for instance, the cause of 
marginalized groups. It is clear that these types of activities can hardly be substituted by 
bilateral aid, regardless of the policy environment.  
5.2  The complement view 
The view of complement NGOs casts doubts on two of the main tenets of the substitute 
theory, namely that (i) government-to-government aid is more effective in countries 
with good governance than in countries without it and (ii) NGO aid can be effective in 
countries with poor governance. According to those advocating the complementary 
view, if NGOs and bilateral donors are active in the same country, synergy effects can 
occur which means that the total impact of aid can be more than the sum of its parts. As 
the Director of the Division of Effectiveness of Quality of the Netherlands Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs states: 
In our policy dialogue with national governments of our priority 
countries, we can create space on the negotiating table for local civil 
society organizations. However, we cannot fill this space ourselves. 
Dutch NGOs can stimulate local organizations to make use of this 
                                                 
6   The relationship between donor and recipient government is also unequal, but recipient governments 
have a relative stronger position as they are a monopoly provider; costs of exit are high for the donor 
government.   
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vacuum that we create. We as a bilateral donor are good at the macro-
level, civil society organizations are strong at the micro level; by 
working in the same countries we can effectively bridge the micro-macro 
gap. 
According to the supporters of the complement view, government-to-government aid is 
not necessarily more effective in countries with better governance, but rather is 
dependent on the type of government-to-government aid being provided. Whereas 
general budget support can be provided in countries with good governance, section 
support and/or project support is possible in countries where only certain ministries are 
functioning properly, and/or in cases where governance is weak across the board, 
respectively. 
The second assumption of NGO aid as a substitute is that these agencies can be 
relatively effective in countries lacking good governance. The proponents of the 
complement view disagree with this assumption on two accounts: the interviewed 
government officials argue that if NGOs were to receive significant amounts of 
financing but local governments not, this could lead to unaccountable parallel 
structures, creating an unbalanced society (DFID 2006b). NGOs point out that in 
countries with poor governance, it is often not possible to find good partners. 
According to the complement theory, NGOs have comparative advantages, but are 
country neutral; that is, NGOs have a comparative advantage in building civil society, 
for instance, and enjoy this comparative advantage in all types of countries, be it well or 
badly governed. Similarly, the assumed comparative advantage of NGOs in developing 
innovative approaches applies to all types of countries.  
5.3 Empirical  evidence 
Do the NGOs behave as substitutes or as complements? Do they operate in countries 
where bilateral donors are active, or do they specialize in other countries? It is important 
to note a difference between behaving as a complement, and actual complementary 
behaviour. This paper examines whether NGOs and bilateral aid statistically 
complement each other. It makes no decision on whether this statistical complementary 
behaviour actually translates into synergy effects in developing countries, or whether 
the combination of bilateral and NGO aid leads to a decrease in the micro-macro gap. 
The first simple test shows that NGO aid behaves more as a complement than as a 
substitute. In the recipient countries, there are significant and positive correlations 
between total bilateral aid per capita and total NGO aid per capita of 0.725 (at 0.01 
significance). Thus, higher per capita aid revenues from bilateral aid are related to 
higher per capita NGO revenues. An in-depth analysis shows that these results also hold 
for all donors individually at the same significance level.  
An aid concentration curve provides a graphical means to determine whether donors 
target specific types of countries. The aid concentration curve plots the cumulative 
percentage of some measure of aid (in this case ODA and official aid in 2004 based on 
OECD/DAC statistics) versus the cumulative percentage of a specific population 
variable (in this case, the total population). The diagonal line projects the allocation if 
aid were provided in direct proportion to the share of world’s poor living in each 
country. When countries on the x-axis are ranked on the basis of their level of  
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governance (as is done here), the aid concentration shows the extent to which a donor 
focuses on countries with different levels of governance. People living in 
poor-governance countries are on the left side of the graph, and people in countries with 
good governance on the right side. Countries such Liberia are situated on the left side, 
while countries such as Uruguay are on the right. An aid curve above the diagonal 
signifies that a donor is focusing on countries with bad governance.7 If NGO aid is 
behaving as the substitute as predicted in the theoretical framework, one would expect 
NGO aid to be above the diagonal and bilateral aid below, reflecting the assumed 
comparative advantages of bilateral donors in countries with relative good levels of 
governance and those of NGOs in countries where this is absent. In this figure, countries 
are represented by lines: flat lines are the populous countries that receive relatively 
small amounts of aid per capita, such as Nigeria, India and China. 
As this figure shows, the lines are above the diagonal, indicating that both aid channels 
spend more aid per capita in countries with rather poor governance. For instance, 66 per 
cent of NGO aid and 60 per cent of bilateral aid go the 40 per cent of the population 
living in developing countries with the worst governance record. Because of the 
correlation between the level of economic development and governance, the apparent 
focus on countries with low levels of democratic governance could also be a reflection 
of an emphasis on the poorest countries. Either way, Figure 3 makes it clear that there is 
little difference in the ‘governance targeting’ of the two channels. The figure suggests 
that aid targeted through the different channels operates more as a complement good (as 
explained, not necessarily working in a complementary way) than as a substitute good. 
Figure 3 
Concentration curves of bilateral and NGO aid  
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Source:   Compiled by author, based on data provided by the NGOs. 
                                                 
7   In this case, governance is measured by the factor score of the six Kaufmann indicators on governance 
in 2004: (i) voice and accountability; (ii) government effectiveness; (iii) control or corruption,   
(iv) regulatory quality, (v) rule of law and (vi) political stability. Gross national income per capita 
(PPP average 1995-2004). The sample consists of all DAC countries (2005 list) for which governance 
data exist.   
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The statistical representation of this aid concentration curve is the Suits index
8 (Baulch 
2003). It can vary between -1 and +1, and an index of -1 corresponds to the situation in 
which a donor gives all its aid to the country on the left side of the figure (in this case, 
the worst governed country, Somalia). A Suits index of +1 implies that a donor gives all 
its aid to countries on the right side (in this case, Chile, the best-governed country in the 
sample), while 0 represents the situation in which a donor distributes its aid in exact 
proportion to the number of poor people, with no reference to the level of governance of 
the countries.9 The Suits index is -0.24 for NGO aid and -0.15 for bilateral aid. NGOs 
focus their aid marginally more on countries with poor governance.10 Nevertheless, the 
similarities are more pronounced than the differences. Both channels on average 
allocate more aid per capita in countries with the lowest levels of governance. China 
and India, the two flat areas, receive the least, confirming the small country bias.  
Thus, taking into consideration both the positive correlation between NGO and bilateral 
aid, and the similar pattern of the concentration curves (ranked by governance), it would 
appear that NGO and bilateral aid do not act as substitutes. In fact, it may be quite to the 
contrary; countries that receive more aid per capita from bilateral donors also receive 
more aid per capita from NGOs, which suggests that the two sources of aid behave as 
complements. Thus, the suggestion from the World Bank, among others, about a 
country-wise division of labour between NGOs and bilateral donors is not confirmed. 
NGOs tend to follow the priorities of their donor countries, or put differently, they 
appear to operate in the slipstream of their back donors. Why is this? 
5.4 Discussion 
Interviews with nongovernment organizations indicate that in the discussion of 
comparative advantages, and how these influence their country allocations, NGOs often 
refer to the comparative advantage of their specific organizations versus that of other 
agencies, instead of the comparative advantages of the NGO sector versus other types of 
donors. This makes it clear that considerations of comparative advantage between 
different aid delivery channels—which is what the substitute view is all about—are 
probably unimportant to NGOs in decisions regarding country allocation. 
Two contradictory theories exist to explain why NGOs choose to operate in the same 
countries as their back donors. A bleak theory, offered by the neoinstitutionalists, 
predicts that when nonprofit organizations are subject to external scrutiny and 
regulation, they gravitate to isomorphic transformation (Frumkin 1998: 22). This 
homogenization occurs as the nonprofit sector adapts practices because of perceived 
expectations of public authorities. NGOs, replying more on the government, will 
concentrate on the priority areas of the government. Although most NGOs are 
independent to choose their sphere of operations, and claim that the government has no 
                                                 
8   The Suits index is calculated as follows = 1 - ∑pi  (CA i + CA i-1), with pi being the share of the 
number of poor people in country i and CA i the cumulative aid share of country i and all poorer 
countries.  
9   Note the difference with the GINI coefficient, which measures the level of concentration regardless of 
country characteristics and which has a value between 0 and 1. 
10  Iraq is excluded as an outlier because so much American bilateral aid went there in 2004. Its inclusion 
would nullify the slightly stronger focus of NGOs on poorly governed countries.  
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direct or indirect impact on country allocations, more subtle processes may be at play. 
Interviews with NGOs indicate that these would like to have visibility vis-à-vis their 
government’s representation abroad. For example, if a back donor has an embassy or an 
office in Cameroon, the NGO may prefer to fund projects there instead of the Central 
African Republic, for instance, where there is no donor government representation.  
According to a more positive explanation, NGOs believe that they can be more effective 
if they complement the efforts of their bilateral donor and thus adjust their country 
allocations accordingly. This study does not identify which factors determine 
complementary behaviour. What it does attempt to do is to map the consequences of the 
apparent predominance of the complementary behaviour. Does the absence of a division 
of labour between NGOs and bilateral donors in terms of country allocations contribute 
to the donor darling/donor orphan divide? A cross-sectional analysis shows that it 
probably does, because some countries receive considerable aid amounts while others 
receive virtually nothing (see Appendix 1 for an overview). 
Before offering recommendations, some deficiencies of the current data and research 
method need to be made explicit. Even though a large number of NGOs consented to 
interviews and provided data, there may be some data bias. NGOs from only four 
countries are included in the sample, and agencies from countries such as France and 
the United Kingdom are missing. Except for colonial ties, which work in different 
directions for these countries, there is no reason to believe that French or British NGOs 
would behave fundamentally different from the sample country NGOs. However, only 
research with data from the excluded NGOs can validate this assumption. Another 
caveat that merits mention is the possibility of reverse causality. The current research 
method does not deal with causality. It may also be possible that a bilateral donor 
operates in the slipstream of the NGO, rather than vice versa. When NGOs operate in a 
certain country, they act as a constituency and lobby for the back donor to assume the 
role of bilateral donor there. A panel analysis could shed more light on which effect 
dominates the relationship between bilateral and NGO aid allocations. Yet irrespective 
of who influences whom, the result is the same: NGOs are active in the same types of 
countries as bilateral donors. 
6  Conclusions and implications 
The first conclusion of this research is that there is a high level of concentration in the 
international NGO aid sector: certain countries receive significant amounts of aid, 
others relatively little. Second, NGOs behave more as complements rather than 
substitutes to bilateral aid: NGOs tend to spend their resources in countries where 
bilateral donors are also active. These conclusions introduce new research questions: 
does this concentration lead to the self-reinforcing clusters of NGOs, as can be seen in 
the for-profit sector? Does this concentration take place because of competitive pressure 
for funding? Would it be beneficial for NGOs and bilateral aid to act more as a 
substitute, or is the current state of affairs satisfactory? With regard to the last question, 
even though there are theoretically clear merits to the complementary approach, this 
study indicates that there are potential drawbacks as well. As identified here, the main 
drawback of behaving as a complement is that it can increase the donor darling/donor 
orphan divide. The study has shown that countries such as Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau, 
Togo, India, Moldova and Central African Republic are now largely bypassed by both  
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bilateral donors and NGOs. This is in sharp contrast to countries such as Uganda, 
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Tanzania and Peru where generous bilateral aid is 
complemented with equally generous assistance from NGOs. Only after all these 
questions have been answered can definitive policy recommendations be given. Based 
on this analysis, some initial policy suggestions can be offered, but these should be 
treated with appropriate caution.  
NGOs on average gave more aid per capita to countries ranked by the United Nations as 
high priority. Yet, from this general pattern there were significant deviations that could 
merit a policy response. Deviations embody certain donors, certain regions, and certain 
size of countries. 
Certain donor countries, particularly the Dutch and the German, could do more to 
ensure that their NGOs target the high-priority countries better. The policy adopted by 
NORAD, the implementing agency of the Norwegian government, could serve as an 
example. The head of the civil society department stated: 
through having discussions with NGOs we convinced them that they 
should spent at least 50 per cent in the least developed countries. It has 
taken us years, but our NGOs—because of our active policy towards 
them—have reached this percentage.  
Specific incentives can entice NGOs to become more active in certain underfunded 
regions, notably in the priority and top-priority countries of South Asia and the Middle 
East and North Africa. Yet this policy recommendation is based on the assumption that 
NGOs can work effectively in these countries, an assumption that merits further 
research.  
As is clear from the above analysis, there is a pattern of strong concentration in the 
allocation of NGO aid. Conditional to better insight into the effects of this concentration 
at the field-level, greater dispersion in international NGO aid appears to be desirable. To 
this end, the theoretical framework suggests ways to stimulate dispersion: strengthening 
the forces that lead to dispersion and minimizing those that lead to concentration. It is 
clear that some of the centripetal and centrifugal forces are stable and independent from 
policy. These include thickness of the labour markets, dispersion of demand and 
transportation costs. Conversely, policy can influence certain factors, such as the 
importance NGO decisionmakers attach to the low ‘price’ of inputs. The theoretical part 
of the paper explained that as the size of the market expands, the decreasing price of 
input stimulates concentration. If an NGO is the first nongovernment agency in a 
location, the costs for entry (in time and finance) will be high; once other NGOs have 
settled in the country, costs are lower for new entrants. Theoretically, if the pressure of 
reducing costs is relaxed, i.e., if donors refrain from applying a standard overhead 
percentage, the emphasis on market size becomes less important, which in turn should 
stimulate dispersion. Promoting an environment that encourages risk-taking and 
openness can downplay another centripetal factor, the blame-sharing effect. Instead of 
withholding finances for NGOs because of unsuccessful projects, donors should assess 
whether these have analysed potential risks in advance and have taken precautionary 
measures and remedial action; steps that government agencies should applaud. By 
stimulating risk-taking, NGOs will be more likely to venture into territories that 
remained hitherto unexplored.   
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Appendix 1 
Appendix Table  
Aid allocations by Germany, Netherlands, Norway and United States 
(in millions € ), 2004 
Country 
NGO  
total   Bilateral*  Total  Country 
NGO 
total   Bilateral*  Total 
           
Albania 8.39  129.4  137.79 Lebanon 10.96  53.2  64.16
Algeria 0.55  10.2  10.75 Lesotho 12.6  10.6  23.2
Angola 70.86  141.3  212.16 Liberia 8.56  165.8  174.36
Argentina 3.91  12.8  16.71 Libya –  2.8  2.8
Armenia 7.43  130.3  137.73 Macedonia 1.84  109.8  111.64
Azerbaijan 10.49  71.2  81.69 Madagascar 16.12  64.7  80.82
Bangladesh 85.96  274.7  360.66 Malawi 59.11  110.0  169.11
Belarus 0.4  20.0  20.4 Malaysia 0.24  6.6  6.84
Belize 0.05  2.5  2.55 Maldives 0.0  0.2  0.2
Benin 6.21  84.3  90.51 Mali 29.87  118.6  148.47
Bhutan 1.46  0.3  1.76 Mauritania 8.83  28.5  37.33
Bolivia 35.93  335.0  370.93 Mauritius 0.06  0.4  0.46
Bosnia-Herzegovina 9.51  127.2 136.71 Mexico  19.63  116.4  136.03
Botswana 4.85  32.7  37.55 Moldova 2.6  55.1  57.7
Brazil 56.34  121.5  177.84 Mongolia 4.29  70.8  75.09
Burkina Faso  5.1  67.4  72.5 Morocco 4.46  271.9  276.36
Burundi 15.96  90.6  106.56 Mozambique 46.61  196.6  243.21
Cambodia 24.07  85.1  109.17 Myanmar 8.0  20.2  28.2
Cameroon 10.38  257.6  267.98 Namibia 5.18  55.0  60.18
Cape Verde  0.0  19.5  19.5 Nepal 22.77  144.3  167.07
Central African Rep.  1.02  19.6 20.62 Nicaragua  30.36  602.9  633.26
Chad 10.25  86.8  97.05 Niger 15.19  23.5  38.69
Chile 7.68  39.3  46.98 Nigeria 38.76  154.1  192.86
China 11.02  442.5  453.52 Oman 0.0  0.6  0.6
Colombia 16.8  709.3  726.1 Pakistan 19.11  262.1  281.21
Comoros 0.0  0.0  0.0 Palestine 29.42  11.0  40.42
Congo, Dem. Rep. of  43.29  320.7 363.99 Panama  1.57 219.8  221.37
Congo, Rep. of  0.22 3.8  4.02 Papua  New  Guinea 0.66 2.4  3.06
Costa Rica  4.1  18.2  22.3 Paraguay 3.21  27.1  30.31
Côte d'Ivoire  2.95  46.3  49.25 Peru 51.18  369.4  420.58
Croatia 4.3  59.8  64.1 Philippines 27.59  145.4  172.99
Cuba 2.62  12.4  15.02 Rwanda 19.84  100.0  119.84
Djibouti 0.0  3.8  3.8 Saudi Arabia  0.0  1.9  1.9
Dominican Rep.  2.02  51.4  53.42 Senegal 9.76  83.0  92.76
Ecuador 17.72  153.1  170.82 Sierra Leone  16.79  43.4  60.19
Egypt 14.59  747.7  762.29 Solomon Islands  –  0.0  0.0
El Salvador  31.12  69.9  101.02 Somalia 27.36  66.1  93.46
Equatorial Guinea  0.06  0.2  0.26 South Africa  33.06  234.3  267.36
         Table  continues
Note: * = Germany, Netherlands, Norway, US. 
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Appendix Table (con’t) 
Aid allocations (in millions €), 2004 
Country 
NGO 
 total   Bilateral* Total Country 
NGO 
 total   Bilateral* Total 
            
Eritrea 10.53  106.8  117.33 Sri Lanka  25.42  79.1  104.52 
Ethiopia 124.69  615.6  740.29 Sudan 61.93  613.1  675.03 
Fiji 1.03  1.8  2.83 Suriname 3.22  75.2  78.42 
Gabon 1.23  4.3  5.53 Tanzania 42.68  2.2  44.88 
Gambia, The  2.47  3.4  5.87 Thailand 10.81  22.4  33.21 
Georgia 12.39  154.0  166.39 Timor-Leste 3.66  69.5  73.16 
Ghana 25.27  137.9  163.17 Swaziland 7.37  239.2  246.57 
Guatemala 37.03  126.8  163.83 Syria 2.62  34.6  37.22 
Guinea-Bissau 1.03  78.5  79.53 Tajikistan 16.0  31.2  47.2 
Guinea 3.14  0.9  4.04 Togo 2.18  11.6  13.78 
Guyana 0.69  40.5  41.19 Trinidad & Tobaco 0.08  2.8  2.88 
Haiti 39.3  168.6  207.9  Tunisia 0.43  56.5  56.93 
Honduras 26.26  150.7  176.96 Turkey 1.01  104.5  105.51 
India 136.97  344.8  481.77 Turkmenistan 0.0 7.7  7.7 
Indonesia 49.11  402.6  451.71 Uganda 58.25  378.6  436.85 
Iran 5.65  67.0  72.65 Ukraine 1.58  165.8  167.38 
Jamaica 0.31  44.2  44.51 Uruguay 0.63  2.1  2.73 
Jordan 4.28  430.8  435.08 Uzbekistan 4.42  53.3  57.72 
Kazakhstan 2.12  81.0  83.12 Venezuela 1.99  19.1  21.09 
Kenya 54.16  294.0  348.16 Vietnam 11.89  132.0  143.89 
Korea, Rep. of  0.71  69.1 69.81 Yemen.  Rep. of  0.48  153.7  154.18 
Kyrgyz Rep.  4.39  47.8  52.19 Zambia 45.86  191.3  237.16 
Laos 4.59  34.0  38.59 Zimbabwe 80.33  43.9  124.23 
Note:   * = Germany, Netherlands, Norway, US. 
Source:  OECD/DAC (for bilateral figures). NGO figures provided by NGOs.  
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Appendix 2: List of interviews with organizations and institutions 
A Nongovernmental  organizations 
Netherlands 
—  Cordaid 
—  ICCO 
—  Hivos (not interviewed) 
—  Novib (now OxfamNovib) 
—  Plan Nederland (not interviewed) 
Germany 
—  Kinder Nothilfe Deutschland 
—  Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst 
—  Friedrich Ebert Stiftung  
—  Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (no country data) 
—  MISEREOR 
Norway 
—  CARE Norway 
—  Norwegian Church Aid 
—  Norwegian People’s Aid 
—  Redd Barna (Save the Children) 
United States 
—  CARE USA 
—  Christian Children’s Fund (not interviewed) 
—  Mercy Corps 
—  Oxfam United States 
—  Population Services International (PSI) 
—  Save the Children USA 
—  World Vision USA 
B  International nongovernment organizations 
—  International Planned Parenthood Federation 
C Institutions 
—  Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Division of Effectiveness and Quality 
(interviewed 6 September 2006) 
—  German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), NGO 
Division (interviewed 8 September 2006) 
—  Norwegian Ministry of Development Cooperation (NORAD), Civil Society 
Department (interviewed 11 September 2006) 